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THe PrObLem OF UNreSOLVeD WrONgDOINg
Kenneth einar Himma
many Christians believe that, because of divine grace, any person who re-
pents of sin, accepts Christianity, and has genuinely authentic faith in god is 
forgiven for her sins and spared completely of the torments of hell. I argue that 
this idea is difficult to reconcile with certain Christian doctrines and common, 
though not universal, moral intuitions about wrongdoing and punishment. 
The main steps are as follows. The violation of an obligation creates a moral 
debt that requires correction by compensation, punishment, and/or forgive-
ness; a wrong that is never punished, compensated, or forgiven perpetuates 
a continuing injustice by leaving a debt unpaid. If it is true that one person’s 
forgiveness cannot release the wrongdoer of a moral debt owed to someone 
else, then god’s forgiveness cannot release a wrongdoer from the moral debts 
she owes to human victims of her wrongs. Something must be done, as a 
moral matter, to deal with those existing moral debts before a saved sinner 
can enjoy the eternal bliss promised to the faithful.
I. Introduction
Many Christians believe that, because of divine grace, it is sufficient for 
salvation that one instantiate certain mental states at the time of one’s 
death. Any person who repents of sin, accepts Christianity, and has genu-
inely authentic faith in god is forgiven for her sins and spared completely 
of the torments of hell. Even the most evil people can be saved, getting 
nothing by way of divine punishment. Indeed, a genuine conversion oc-
curring during a person’s dying breaths is sufficient, on the traditional 
view, to be spared of divine punishment and enjoy the infinite benefits 
of salvation.
I argue that these views about salvation are difficult to reconcile with 
certain Christian doctrines and common, though not universal,1 moral in-
tuitions about wrongdoing and punishment. The main steps are as fol-
lows. The violation of an obligation creates a moral debt that requires cor-
rection by compensation, punishment, and/or forgiveness; a wrong that 
is never punished, compensated, or forgiven perpetuates a continuing in-
justice by leaving a debt unpaid. If it is true that one person’s forgiveness 
1It is important at the outset to acknowledge that these intuitions are not universal among 
Christians; if the reader rejects one of the intuitive claims I assume, then my argument does 
not work. But they are sufficiently common (and reasonable) that they should seem at least 
prima facie plausible even to readers inclined to reject them. The rejection of any one, it seems 
to me, requires some sort of argument. 
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cannot release the wrongdoer of a moral debt owed to someone else, then 
god’s forgiveness cannot release a wrongdoer from the moral debts she 
owes to human victims of her wrongs. Something must be done, as a mor-
al matter, to deal with those existing moral debts before a saved sinner can 
enjoy the eternal bliss promised to the faithful. I do not make any claims 
about exactly what the specific nature of this additional element should 
be, but I suggest that there are some cases requiring punitive or quasi-
punitive response.
II. Moral Wrongs and Corrective Justice
It is natural to think of moral wrongs as creating debts owed to the person 
who has been wronged. If A has a claim or right against B, then violation 
of that right seems to create some sort of moral “debt”; since the claim be-
longs to A, the debt seems owed to A. Likewise, if B owes A an obligation, 
then violation of that obligation entails that A has been wronged. but the 
wrong seems to create a debt by putting A in a worse position than she 
otherwise should have been. Since the obligation was owed to A, the debt 
seems also owed to A.
To the extent that wrongdoing creates some sort of moral “debt” on the 
part of the wrongdoer, many instances of human wrongdoing will create 
multiple debts. All human wrongdoing creates a debt arising from the 
wrong against god. but much human wrongdoing will also create debts 
arising from the wrongs against its human victims.2 Murder, for example, 
will create at least two debts: a debt owed to god from its being sin and 
a debt owed to the victim from its violating the victim’s right to life.3 In-
deed, murder will create a host of debts to those friends and relatives who 
have lost a loved one—and might even involve a wrong against an entire 
community as a breach of the peace.
These various debts are morally independent in the following sense: 
they are specific as to victims. While certain victimless wrongdoing, if 
such there be, may create some sort of generalized debt or may create no 
debt at all, wrongdoing that occurs against a victim creates a debt owed to 
that victim. If a murderer kills someone’s father, his wrongdoing creates 
2Richard Swinburne offers a similar account in Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 81–109. I am indebted to a referee for making 
me aware of this discussion.
3One might think the principle “ought implies can” entails that one cannot owe a debt to 
a murder victim because one cannot possibly discharge that debt. but “ought implies can” 
excludes cases in which the person owing a duty has culpably put himself or herself in a po-
sition where the duty cannot be satisfied. A drunk driver who hits a wall cannot excuse her 
conduct by arguing that it was impossible for her to drive responsibly because she was intoxi-
cated; “ought implies can” does not apply in any way favorable to the drunk driver. Notice 
that this is a different objection from the objection that one cannot owe a dead person a moral 
obligation or a debt since the person is no longer there; one can take this position, but this 
would entail denying that we have an obligation to a decedent to distribute her property ac-
cording to the terms of her will. The intuition that we can owe duties to dead people and have 
debts to them is a common one that grounds many legal duties apparently owed to decedents 
as well as moral duties. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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debts owed to god, the murder victim, and the victim’s child. but these 
debts are distinct because the act results in multiple wrongs: the trans-
gression of god’s law, the violation of the victim’s right to life, and the 
violation of the wrongdoer’s obligation to that child not to wrongfully 
jeopardize his well-being.
The metaphorical idea that wrongdoing creates debts that must be re-
solved in some way is at the foundation of ideas about “corrective jus-
tice.” Theories of corrective justice, unlike utilitarian theories of justice, 
are wholly backward looking: whereas utilitarian theories emphasize the 
future consequences to community well-being, corrective theories empha-
size the need to rectify existing injustices that arise from past wrongful 
acts. Theories of corrective justice see various individual or societal re-
sponses to wrongdoing as a way of correcting or rectifying moral debts 
created by wrongful acts.
The idea that these injustices must, as a moral matter, be corrected or 
rectified is most plausibly explained in terms of some legitimate expecta-
tion or right that the victim has in virtue of having the right kind of moral 
standing. Qua moral person, I have a moral right to be compensated for 
injuries caused by a person’s culpable behavior. Qua moral person, I have 
a moral right that persons who commit criminal acts against me be pun-
ished—not necessarily as some sort of expression of vengeance or retali-
ation, but as a way of acknowledging my worth as an intrinsically (and 
hence morally) valuable being. Wrongdoing that victimizes me creates a 
debt owed to me and that must in some way be discharged by me or paid 
to me. While this does not preclude a response that is initiated by other 
entities (such as a morally legitimate state) or other persons (such as God) 
that would contribute to “resolving the debt,” the efficacy of this response 
depends on its addressing the fact that the debt is owed to me.
Now it is crucial to note that no claim is being made here that we have 
rights against god or that god owes us obligations—a contentious view. 
What is claimed here is that other people create debts owed to us because 
we have rights against them and those other people owe obligations to us. 
While I will make certain claims about what god must do given god’s 
moral perfection, they do not depend on taking the view either that god 
owes us obligations or that we have rights against god.4
III. Corrective Justice and Traditional Christianity
There is much here not entirely clear. It is easy to see how forgiveness 
might suffice, as a moral matter, to resolve a debt; forgiveness is not un-
like any other consensual act by which an obligor releases a person from 
an obligation. Insofar as I can waive an obligation owed to me by another 
person in advance (e.g., by consenting to a person’s entry upon my prop-
erty, I temporarily waive my right to exclude her from such), it seems 
reasonable to think that I can completely release a party from a moral debt 
4I am indebted to anonymous referee for making me aware of the need to make this point.
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to me created by a breach of an obligation owed to me by an act of forgive-
ness. Indeed, this seems to be the conceptual point of forgiveness. If so, the 
moral ledger is at least partly restored by an act of forgiveness as between 
offender and offended.
It is not clear that punishment can fully address the moral debt. Pun-
ishment might be deserved and thereby avoid the further injustice of al-
lowing a wrongdoer to get away with wrong. It might even square the 
moral ledger in some cases. but it seems implausible to think that full 
punishment necessarily evens the moral ledger. Punishing the murderer 
of someone I love, after all, does nothing to diminish my loss; but, more 
importantly, punishment does not balance the ledger between murderer 
and victim because it cannot bring the victim back to life.
The same considerations apply to compensation. It might be some 
wrongs result in injury that can be fully compensated so as to balance the 
moral ledger; if, for example, A takes $5.00 from B in an armed robbery, 
then A can fully compensate B for the economic effects of theft: $5.00 com-
pounded by the relevant interest rate fully compensates for the economic 
injury (assuming the only injury is economic). But some wrongs simply 
cannot be adequately compensated. For example, there is nothing a mur-
derer can do to compensate the murder victim for the loss of life. And 
I doubt a murderer can fully compensate a victim’s loved ones for their 
losses. Monetary compensation is extremely limited in what it can do to 
rectify moral debts.
even a fully compensated loss might still need the help of punishment 
to balance the moral ledger. even if the victim of the robbery’s only injuries 
are economic and are fully compensated, I would surmise that most read-
ers would agree that the robber should still be punished—indeed, even if 
the victim has forgiven the wrongdoer and even if no utilitarian benefits 
are thereby achieved; in this case, punishment is necessary to restore the 
moral ledger because the robber should, as a moral matter, get the punish-
ment she deserves for her crime. This suggests that, in some cases, no one 
corrective measure will be enough to balance the moral ledger and that all 
three might be required.
The idea that wrongdoing requires punishment, compensation, for-
giveness, or some combination of the three seems central not only to or-
dinary moral (and legal) practices and judgments, but also to traditional 
Christianity. To begin with, the traditional view that nonbelievers deserve 
eternity in hell as divine punishment for sins presupposes a retributivist 
and hence corrective view of punishment. moreover, ordinary norms of 
corrective justice seem reflected in the common view that God’s forgive-
ness is needed to justifiably spare sinners of punishment. On this view, 
god’s forgiveness helps to balance the ledger between god and sinner in-
sofar as it releases the sinner from the debt to god that arises from sin—a 
necessary prerequisite for sparing the sinner the punishment she deserves; 
thus, a morally perfect god could not simply spare all sinners without a 
mediating act of forgiveness.
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IV. Faith as a Sufficient Condition for Avoiding Divine Punishment
It is generally thought that faith in Jesus is a sufficient condition for being 
forgiven by god and spared all divine punishment. First, faith in Christ is 
a sufficient condition for salvation. John 3:16 states, for example, that “For 
god so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever 
believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life.” Faith, of course, 
includes propositional belief that the core doctrines of Christianity are 
true, but it also involves a commitment to do the will of god and hence 
involves some kind of sincere behavioral commitment. Second, the result 
of salvation is that the sinner is completely spared of punishment. These 
two claims, then, yield the familiar view: genuine faith in Jesus Christ is a 
sufficient condition for an eternal life in bliss free of the suffering associ-
ated with punitive or quasi-punitive measures.
What entirely determines one’s ultimate fate on this traditional view, 
then, is whether one instantiates the proper mental states (hereinafter CMS 
for “the Christian mental state”) at the time of one’s death. If one believes 
that the relevant tenets of Christianity are true and has the right sort of 
mental states (which includes continuing repentance and a commitment 
to accept and follow Jesus), then it doesn’t matter whether one actually 
has an opportunity to express those commitments in good works—either 
because one has certain disabilities or because one’s lifespan is too short 
to realize those commitments. Nor, strictly speaking, does it matter with 
respect to the character of one’s ultimate fate what sort of life one has led 
up to the point of instantiating the appropriate mental states. Instantiation 
of CMS is sufficient to ensure the forgiveness of sins and immunity, so to 
speak, from divine punishment.
v. salvation, limited Authority to Forgive, and Unresolved evil:  
The Problem
The preceding analysis implies that people can be saved any time prior to 
death. If instantiating CMS is a sufficient condition for salvation and hence 
for escaping eternal punishment, then salvation is possible for as long as 
an individual is able to instantiate CmS. The thief who died on the cross 
next to Jesus was saved by his last-second repentance and acceptance of 
Jesus and thereby spared of all divine punishment.
Viewed from one angle, this is as it should be. The forgiveness of the 
party wronged seems at least sometimes, if not always, sufficient to wholly 
release the wrongdoer from the debt created by her wrongdoing and hence 
to wholly balance the moral ledger between wrongdoer and wronged. 
moreover, the willingness to freely forgive, at the very least, is usually a 
profound moral virtue. Thus, it seems utterly unproblematic, as a moral 
matter, that an omnibenevolent and loving God is always willing to release 
a repentant sinner from her debt by a gracious act of forgiveness.
but ordinary moral intuitions suggest that one party’s forgiveness is suf-
ficient to release a wrongdoer from only that part of the moral debt that is 
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owed to her in consequence of the wrongdoer’s misdeed.5 If, for example, A 
steals something jointly belonging to B and C, then A has wronged both B 
and C and is morally indebted to both B and C. While B’s forgiveness may 
suffice to release A from the debt owed to B, it does nothing to release A 
from the debt owed to C. To resolve the moral debt owed by A to C, at least 
one of the three things must happen: (1) A receives punishment on C’s be-
half from a legitimate representative of C; (2) A compensates C for damag-
es caused by A’s wrongdoing; or (3) C freely forgives A. For this reason, the 
unilateral acts of B cannot resolve the evil created by A’s wrongful conduct 
towards C. On ordinary views, one agent’s forgiveness is not sufficient, as a 
matter of moral principle, to release another from the wrongs she commits 
against other agents. The authority to release moral debts through forgive-
ness is limited only to debts owed to the person who is wronged.
This creates a general problem for traditional Christianity best illus-
trated by first considering how it arises in connection with deathbed con-
versions. Suppose that Hitler had not committed suicide (dying instead 
of other causes), had experienced a genuine conversion on his deathbed, 
and died instantiating CmS. Despite the fact that he is responsible for mil-
lions of murders, Hitler’s instantiation of CmS spares him of the eternal 
punishment he would otherwise have received. His fate after judgment, 
according to traditional Christianity, is an eternal and infinitely fulfilling 
communion with god.
Hitler’s behavior results in a horrifically large number of wrongs. Each 
of Hitler’s murders sins against god and creates a moral debt owed to 
god. Furthermore each of these murders wrongs not only the victims but 
also the victim’s surviving friends and family (and possibly humanity it-
self). Every such act, then, creates a profound and complex moral distur-
bance that involves large moral debts to god and to each of a potentially 
very large class of human beings.
god’s forgiveness releases Hitler from the debts he owes to god, but it 
cannot, if ordinary moral intuitions are correct, release Hitler from those 
he owes to his human victims. These intuitions suggest that only the credi-
tor/obligor can release the debtor/obligee from her debt by forgiveness. Of 
course, as was noted earlier, there may be other ways to resolve the debt, 
which include punishment of or compensation by the wrongdoer. but if 
neither punishment nor compensation occurs, then only an act of forgive-
ness on the part of the victim can, according to ordinary moral intuitions, 
suffice to release the wrongdoer from her debt to the victim—although 
it is important to recall that there are some cases where even forgiveness 
does not suffice.
5This view is taken for granted in the literature on forgiveness. See, e.g., Howard mcgary, 
“Forgiveness,” American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989), pp. 343–350; Jeffrie Murphy, “For-
giveness and resentment,” Midwest studies in Philosophy 7 (1982), p. 504; Paul M. Hughes, 
“What is Involved in Forgiving?” Journal of value Inquiry 27 (1993), pp. 331–340; and Aurel 
Kolnai, “Forgiveness,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian society 74 (1973–1974), pp. 91–106. I am 
indebted to Paul Hughes for this point.
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Hitler’s immediate salvation would, thus, leave many unpaid moral 
debts in the world. Given that (1) Hitler’s wrongdoing has not been forgiv-
en by each of his victims, (2) Hitler’s victims have not been compensated 
for the wrongs they experienced, and (3) Hitler receives no punishment, 
his salvation leaves tremendous moral debt in the world that would, if the 
traditional view is correct, remain forever unpaid.
The problem is not limited to the case of deathbed conversions. It arises 
for all of us—even people who have been committed Christians since they 
reached the age of reason. even the best of lifelong Christians are prone 
to lusting after (or objectifying), judging, envying, and deceiving others. 
Such acts violate not only our obligations to god, but also obligations 
owed to the victims of those acts; accordingly, these acts create a large 
number of debts that are owed to beings other than god.
While each of these human debts may seem comparatively small (as 
compared to the debts created by murder), they seem to add up to some-
thing significant over a lifetime. I can’t, e.g., remember a day in which I 
didn’t experience illicit lust or make a harsh judgment about someone. 
Though I try to prevent myself from such acts, I am a sinner who continu-
ously adds to the human debts I owe.
most of the wrongness that I introduce into the world remains unre-
solved despite continuing repentance. Indeed, the vast majority of people 
I wrong with those mental states have no idea they have been wronged 
by me. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that such persons might have 
directed an act of forgiveness towards me. No matter how hard I try, my 
death will leave significant debts to others that will remain unforgiven 
and unpaid—something true of all of us sinners. The moral debts my sins 
create, if I receive no divine punishment, will hence remain unresolved.
The idea that God would leave unresolved evil in the world is difficult 
to reconcile with god’s moral perfection. A person with authority to judge 
and redress the wrongdoing of others has a moral obligation to exercise 
that authority in a way that resolves as many of the wrongdoer’s debts 
as possible. A judge who unilaterally decided to, say, throw out all civil 
suits if she became convinced of the defendant’s repentance and remorse 
would be acting wrongly—and this is true even if (1) the judge were infal-
lible in discerning the appropriate mental states and (2) the parties and 
public all understood this. (Of course, judges are not infallible, but that 
is not relevant. The point is that we would have the same reaction even 
if somehow a judge could ascertain this in a particular defendant with 
demonstrable certainty.)
The problem of unresolved evil, then, is to reconcile ordinary under-
standings of what morality requires of authority in dispensing justice with 
the traditional Christian view that any person can avoid divine punish-
ment simply by instantiating CmS at the time of her death. The claim that 
instantiation of CMS is sufficient for avoiding all punishment is in con-
spicuous tension with the common view that justice demands that moral 
debts be resolved when possible.
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vI. objections and Replies
A. God’s Authority to Efficaciously Forgive Is Not Limited
One might respond that god’s authority to forgive is not subject to famil-
iar standards of corrective justice and that god’s forgiveness, unlike ours, 
is capable of resolving not only moral debts owed to god, but also moral 
debts owed to other beings. On this view, divine forgiveness restores the 
balance of justice disturbed by a person’s wrongdoing as between all af-
fected parties. Different standards of corrective justice apply to God in 
virtue of god’s special moral status in the world; the ordinary ones gov-
erning our behavior are inapplicable to god’s acts.
There are a number of reasons for rejecting this claim. To begin with, it 
is not clear how any of god’s perfections could enable god’s forgiveness 
to annul debts owed to third parties. god’s omnipotence does not seem 
relevant because the problem of resolving evil in the world is less a causal 
matter than it is a moral matter. My ability to cancel a debt by forgiving it 
is not achieved by means of a series of causes and effects that begins with 
my willing an act of forgiveness; the relevant ability or capacity is pri-
marily moral, rather than causal, in nature. If the notion of omnipotence 
picks out purely causal abilities, then god’s omnipotence cannot ground 
the ability to annul moral debts owed to others.
Nor is it clear how god’s moral or epistemic perfection would give rise 
to this capacity. Indeed, it is not even clear that the claim that an omni-
scient, morally perfect being has forgiven P entails even the claim that it 
would be unjust for other persons not to forgive P (because the wrongs 
against God are distinct from, and arise under different moral standards 
from, those against other persons). Here it is worth noting that mere re-
pentance does not, according to traditional Christianity, suffice to elicit a 
forgiving response from god; in addition, the penitent must accept core 
Christian doctrine and direct a personal petition to god asking for for-
giveness. god’s forgiveness is thus a response to a personal gesture that 
is directed to god. If a being may withhold forgiveness in the absence of 
such a gesture without violating an obligation, then the claim that god 
has forgiven P does not entail that it is unjust for persons who have not 
been asked by P for forgiveness to withhold it from P.
but even if the claim that god forgives P implies that it is unjust for any 
person to withhold forgiveness from P, the claim that it is unjust for any-
one not to release P from her debts doesn’t imply that P is released from 
all debts.6 I think, e.g., that the U.S. has a moral obligation to release Third 
World countries from their stifling financial debts to the U.S., but I do not 
think that this fact succeeds, as a moral matter, in releasing them from those 
6It is worth noting that anyone who is already saved will have forgiven all wrongdo-
ing against them; it is reasonable to think that a person cannot be fully Christian without 
forgiving transgressions committed against her—as, for example, is suggested by the Lord’s 
Prayer. This means that the problem of unresolved evil, strictly speaking, will arise only for 
those who have not been saved. I am indebted to Steve Layman for pointing this out to me.
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debts. The notion that one person might unjustly demand satisfaction of 
a moral debt is not clearly false or conceptually incoherent. Accordingly, 
it is not clear how God’s special moral status would explain why special 
standards of corrective justice afford God the ability to release wrongdoers 
from debts owed to other persons by an act of divine forgiveness.
Finally, it is worth noting that something like this move is equally appli-
cable to every problem of philosophical theology implicating god’s moral 
perfection. The problem of evil disappears if we assume god’s agency is 
not subject to the same moral standards as ours; so there is no reason to 
think that the amount of evil needs a philosophical reconciliation with 
god’s moral perfection. Likewise for the proportionality objection to the 
traditional doctrine of hell: ordinary people might be morally constrained 
to punish wrongdoing proportionately, but god is not: as creator and sov-
ereign of the world, god has moral liberty to punish people as harshly and 
disproportionately as god pleases.
At the end of the day, all this might be correct. but resting on any such 
claim without argument seems curiously ad hoc because we assume that 
we understand morality well enough to see that ordinary norms apply to 
god as well—and this is, again, presupposed in our philosophical theol-
ogy. The proportionality problem is a problem only if the ordinary stan-
dards governing our institutions of punishment also apply to god. The 
problem of evil is a problem only if ordinary standards having to do with 
the circumstances under which someone who can prevent evil and knows 
about it should do so also apply to god. The divine command theory can 
be rejected on the strength of the claim that it falsely implies that god’s 
commands could make it obligatory to torture newborn infants for fun 
only if god’s commands are subject to ordinary moral standards. The 
problem of the atonement is a problem only if we assume that ordinary 
moral standards dictating that good people who can prevent gratuitous 
suffering without significant cost to themselves should do so. The whole 
point of atonement theories is to show how Jesus’s suffering was not gra-
tuitous. Indeed, in the case of the stronger theories, the point is to show 
that Jesus’s suffering is necessary to secure the great moral good of divine 
forgiveness of human sin.
B. Is a Person’s Repentance Sufficient to Resolve All Moral Debts?
One might, however, think that it would be morally problematic for god to 
punish Hitler because he has repented and accepted Christ, but this claim 
seems hard to justify. As far as our criminal justice practices are concerned 
(which track ordinary moral judgments), repentance is not sufficient to 
effect a complete release of the wrongdoer from the debt her behavior cre-
ates: even in cases where there is no plausible doubt about the criminal’s 
repentance, she is rightly required to submit to some sort of punishment.
This is not to deny that remorse and repentance play some justified 
role in reducing punishment. Judges and juries will sometimes reduce the 
level of punishment to take into account the criminal’s remorsefulness, but 
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this is most plausibly characterized as an act of mercy made possible by 
something approximating institutional forgiveness. Similarly, convicted 
criminals can reduce the time they must serve in prison by good behavior 
and productive use of their time, but this is most plausibly characterized 
as being justified by pragmatic considerations: in most cases, the crimi-
nal will be returned to society, and it is in everyone’s interests that she 
develop skills and character traits that facilitate her assimilation into the 
law-abiding population. rarely, if ever, is someone who is convicted of a 
reasonably serious offense allowed to escape punishment entirely on the 
strength of her repentance.
If natural law retributivist michael S. moore is correct, these legal prac-
tices reflect intuitions shared by most people:
[Suppose that a] murderer has truly found Christ, for example, so that he or 
she does not need to be reformed; he or she is not dangerous for the same 
reason; and the crime can go undetected so that general deterrence does not 
demand punishment (alternatively, we can pretend to punish and pay the 
person the money the punishment would have cost us to keep his or her 
mouth shut, which will also serve the ends of deterrence). In such a situa-
tion, should the criminal still be punished? my hypothesis is that most of us 
still feel some inclination, no matter how tentative, to punish.7
As an empirical matter, I have described a similar thought experiment 
to at least 1000 students. Fewer than 2 percent of my students take the 
position that the murderer should go free. If these admittedly anecdotal 
considerations are a reliable indication, most people share the intuition 
that justice demands that serious wrongdoing be punished—which helps 
to explain why most of us are content with the relevant criminal justice 
practices. Insofar as one shares these intuitions, they create problems for 
the idea that a person’s repentance alone is enough to resolve the debts she 
owes to other people.
It is true that we are never in an epistemic position to know that an of-
fender has genuinely instantiated CmS and is truly repentant, but that 
is irrelevant. The point is that even if we did know, it would not, on ordi-
nary views, justify sparing the offender of any punishment—and there 
are surely logically conceivable circumstances in which we could be as 
justified in believing this as we are in believing any other empirical claim.8 
In any event, the mere possibility of such a situation is enough to make 
the point that michael moore wants to make: according to our ordinary 
intuitions, instantiating CmS and genuine repentance from wrongdoing 
7michael S. moore, “The moral Worth of retribution,” in Responsibility, Character, and the 
emotions, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
8Scientists are developing brain-imaging technology that can determine whether a person 
is lying at a much higher degree of accuracy than existing polygraphs, which measure anxiety 
levels. See, e.g., Robin Marantz Henig, “Looking for the lie” (new York Times Magazine, Febru-
ary 5, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/magazine/05lying.html?scp=2&sq=lie%20
detecting%20brain&st=cse. While they have not yet succeeded, it is nomologically possible 
that such a device provide readings sufficiently reliable in justifying beliefs about whether a 
person is telling the truth to justify basing punitive consequences on it.
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would not justify a judge in sparing a murderer from punishment—even 
if there are no utilitarian reasons for punishing her. Ordinary intuitions, 
then, are inconsistent with the idea that a person’s repentance is sufficient, 
as a moral matter, to resolve debts she owes to another person in virtue of 
some wrongful act.
One might think that repentance is sufficient to balance the moral led-
ger in the following sort of case. Suppose A wrongfully injures B and 
would be willing to accept punishment and to compensate B for her in-
juries, where either punishment or compensation would be sufficient to 
balance the ledger. but, for reasons beyond A’s control, A is unable to be 
punished or provide compensation. In that case, one might argue that B 
morally ought not to press the case against A, concluding that the debt 
created by the wrong has been balanced.9
If this is the argument, I think it is problematic. If A is genuinely re-
pentant but cannot make good on the debt she owes to B or be punished, 
it is true that B morally ought not to press the case against A; there is 
simply no point in it. A is already perfectly remorseful and cannot do any-
thing about it, so pressing the case achieves no morally valuable end. (No-
tice, however, that if either of A’s disabilities were removed, the outcome 
changes; an injured B ought to pursue at least partial compensation to 
more fairly allocate burdens. And if A can be punished, she ought to be.) 
but the claim that B morally ought not to press the case does not imply 
the ledger between A and B has been balanced. It should be clear that A’s 
disabilities and remorse are relevant in the issue of whether to pursue a 
morally pointless act, but not in squaring the debt owed to B.10
C. Has Christ Received All Punishment on Behalf of Sinners?
One might argue that Christ’s suffering and death on the cross is sufficient 
to pay all moral debts that might arise in connection with human wrong-
doing. On this view, which draws from the penalty theory of the atone-
ment, Christ voluntarily stood in for us and accepted all the punishment 
that we deserve for our wrongdoing; Christ’s suffering on the cross was 
thus sufficient to satisfy all the demands of justice that arise in connection 
with human wrongdoing—including those involving debts owed to other 
human beings. Thus, for example, there is no injustice in allowing salva-
tion to Hitler since Christ bore all the punishment that Hitler deserves for 
his wrongdoing.
9I owe this objection to an anonymous referee, whose language I adopt here to describe 
the objection so as to avoid the appearance of setting up a straw man.
10But even if one can find a few examples like this that resist my analysis, it seems to 
me that I have identified enough cases that cause problems for the idea that instantiating 
CmS spares a saved sinner of all divine punishment. The strategy pursued above assumes 
wrongly that one case in which the principles of corrective justice I describe do not apply is 
enough to falsify my thesis. my thesis is the modest one that there are some cases in which it 
is unfair, under applicable norms of corrective justice, for someone who instantiates CmS to 
be spared of divine punishment. Finding cases where someone who instantiates CmS should 
be spared of divine punishment simply does not do the needed work. 
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The problem is that this move begs the question: the most that can be 
assumed here is that Christ’s suffering and death was enough to annul all 
our debts that arise from sins against god and hence that are owed to god. 
And that is the standard theological story on these theories of atonement: 
something had to be done about the debt we owe to god before god could 
forgive sin—and Christ’s sacrifice on the cross was the gesture that ad-
dressed these debts. It is no part of these theological explanations of the 
atonement that Christ bore the punishment or paid the debt for all wrongs; 
he bore the punishment or paid the debt for all sins against god.
D. Is Forgiveness Morally Obligatory?
One might argue that god need not punish Christians who have repented 
for their sins since those who have been wronged are morally obligated 
to forgive repentant sinners for their sins. If, on this view, the victim of a 
wrong is not willing to forgive a repentant Christian sinner for his or her 
sins, then that breach of a moral obligation releases god from any need to 
address the moral debt created by the act of wrongdoing.
This seems problematic for a variety of reasons. First, it seems incon-
sistent with certain bedrock mainstream Christian views. To begin, if sal-
vation is a matter of grace and forgiveness of sin is at least one necessary 
condition for being saved (instantiating CMS being another necessary 
condition), then forgiveness cannot be morally obligatory—at least not as 
a general matter. This is not to say that forgiveness is not morally good or 
virtuous—perhaps even ideal; it is god’s perfect goodness that is invoked 
to explain this remarkably generous act of God in forgiving us. Indeed, it 
is because forgiveness is a matter of grace that profound gratitude is not 
only appropriate but also seems morally required of us. but gratitude is 
not generally required for acts that are morally required.
None of this makes sense if we assume that god is morally required 
to forgive sin. As a conceptual matter, meeting an obligation is satisfying 
a minimum standard of behavior that it would be wrong to violate. If in 
telling the truth I am just meeting an obligation, then it would be wrong 
to say I have done “good”; praise is warranted for behavior that is good 
but not required—i.e., beyond the call of duty—and not merely for meet-
ing one’s minimal obligations. We cannot have it both ways here: we must 
either deny that god’s forgiveness evinces generosity beyond the call of 
duty or deny that forgiveness is always morally obligatory.
Denying that forgiveness is always morally obligatory seems more sen-
sible from the standpoint of ordinary moral intuitions. We frequently mar-
vel at acts of forgiveness that seem extraordinary to us, regarding them 
as acts of grace for which gratitude is owed. Consider, for example, the 
response of the Amish community to the murder of five Amish school-
children by Charles Roberts, who then committed suicide. The decision 
of the community to attend Roberts’s funeral as a demonstration of their 
forgiveness was considered astonishing and made headlines around the 
world: words used to describe their gesture include “grace,” “noble but 
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impossible ideal,” and “shocking”11—not exactly the language one would 
expect if their forgiveness was morally obligated.
Indeed, many people shared the reaction of Jeff Jacoby who cited the 
bible in an oft-discussed op-ed piece arguing that the Amish should not 
have forgiven roberts:
but hatred is not always wrong, and forgiveness is not always deserved. I 
admire the Amish villagers’ resolve to live up to their Christian ideals even 
amid heartbreak, but how many of us would really want to live in a society 
in which no one gets angry when children are slaughtered? In which even 
the most horrific acts of cruelty were always and instantly forgiven? There 
is a time to love and a time to hate, ecclesiastes teaches. If anything deserves 
to be hated, surely it is the pitiless murder of innocents.12
Jacoby was not just denying that such forgiveness was obligatory or good; 
he was claiming that it was wrong to forgive such acts.
This, it seems to me, is too strong, but it does gesture in the way of 
explaining why forgiveness might be good but not required in some 
cases. There are cases in which wrongdoing results in injury that can be 
adequately compensated for; in those cases, forgiveness and compensa-
tion might suffice to balance the moral ledger between offender and vic-
tim. In some cases, however, wrongdoing results in a loss that cannot be 
significantly addressed by compensation; in such instances, the victim 
must carry around a grievous loss for the rest of her life. Charles roberts 
inflicted such a loss on the parents of those children and on the Amish 
community; there is nothing that can begin to compensate for the loss of 
a child and the terrible grief that comes with it. While the community’s 
decision to forgive roberts seems praiseworthy, ordinary intuition sug-
gests that it would not be morally wrong for at least the parents not to 
have forgiven roberts.
The idea that forgiveness is a matter of grace, rather than requirement, 
seems to conform to our ordinary response to especially grievous wrong-
doing. If, e.g., the national dialogue in our country is any indication, most 
of us, Christian and non-Christian alike, seem not to have forgiven al-
Qaeda for 9/11. It is not just that we are waging “war on terrorism” as a 
matter of self-defense; many of us see it as being justified in retaliation of 
an evil that should not be forgiven.
The language of the Lord’s Prayer might be thought to support the idea 
that forgiveness is always morally required but, upon closer look, better 
supports the view that it is not. It is sometimes overlooked that the for-
giveness we ask for in the Lord’s Prayer—given to us in slightly different 
forms in Matthew 6:9–13 and Luke 11:2–4—is constrained by the forgive-
ness we extend to other people: “Forgive us for our transgressions as we 
11Donald b. Kraybill, Steven m. Nolt, and David L. Weaver-Zercher, Amish grace: how 
Forgiveness Transcended Tragedy (Jossey-Bass, 2007); excerpt available at http://www.pbs.org/
wnet/religionandethics/week1103/interview5.html. 
12Jeff Jacoby, “Undeserved Forgiveness” (Boston globe, October 8, 2006), http://www.boston 
.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/10/08/undeserved_forgiveness/. 
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forgive those who transgress against us” is the familiar petition. This seems to 
suggest that god will forgive us only insofar as we forgive others. While 
this might seem to suggest that forgiveness is always obligatory, it does 
not: otherwise, our failure to forgive others could not justify god’s not 
fully forgiving us. Indeed, it seems to confirm that forgiveness is at least 
sometimes conferred as a matter of grace and that it is morally good, rath-
er than required. The petition teaches us to be graceful and merciful where 
it is not required so as to receive god’s grace and mercy in the form of 
forgiveness where it is not required.13
but even if it were morally obligatory, it does not follow that punish-
ment is not required as a moral matter. To begin, the above suggests that 
in some cases compensation is needed to fully address a moral debt owed 
by a wrongdoer to a victim; it would not be surprising if even repentant 
wrongdoers nonetheless deserved some punishment. Again, most people 
would take the position that even if we knew that a guilty murderer was 
as repentant for the killing as one could be, the murderer should still, as a 
moral matter, be punished.
One might argue that there is at least one circumstance in which for-
giveness is morally required. As an intuitive matter, A seems to have 
wronged C if (i) A petitions for and accepts B’s forgiveness for a serious 
transgression that A committed, and (ii) C petitions for A’s forgiveness 
for a morally trifling transgression that C committed, but A withholds 
forgiveness from C. If so, then A is morally obligated to forgive C under 
these conditions.
One might reasonably think this principle entails that human beings are 
morally required to forgive all moral debts owed to them because these 
debts are morally trifling compared to those that God forgives. On this 
familiar reasoning, the magnitude of the wrongdoing is determined by 
the magnitude of the being that is wronged. Thus, whereas the magnitude 
of even the sum total of Hitler’s wrongs against human beings is a mind-
bogglingly large finite quantity, it is still infinitesimally small compared 
to the infinite magnitude of his wrongs against God. Accordingly, human 
beings are obligated to forgive even the worst wrongs.
There are several problems here. First, this principle would apply only 
to Christians who have petitioned for and accepted god’s forgiveness. At 
most, this principle would show that Christians owe moral forgiveness 
for debts owed them by other Christians. It does not have application to 
atheists, agnostics, and persons of other faiths. So it cannot address the 
general problem.
Second, even if it were true that it applied universally, the claim that 
we are obligated to forgive debts owed to us does not imply that god’s 
forgiveness can settle those debts. The fact that it might be morally wrong 
13One might argue that those who have been forgiven by god are obligated to forgive 
others. even if this is true, this would only apply to those who have been saved. There would 
still be a problem of unresolved evil for those who have not. See note 6, above.
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for me to withhold forgiveness does not imply that someone else’s for-
giveness can release the wrongdoer from a debt that is owed to me.14
Finally, even if we assume that the magnitude of a wrong is determined 
by the magnitude of the being wronged, this is of little help here. The 
claim that Hitler’s debt to human beings is small relative to Hitler’s debt 
to god does not entail that Hitler’s debt to human beings can be justly 
ignored. A finite debt owed to a finite being might be small compared to 
an infinite debt owed to an infinite being, but it does not follow that it is 
morally trifling. Surely, the debts owed by a murderer to the victim and 
to the people who love the victim are not morally trifling—even if they 
are finite and hence small compared to those owed to God. A substantial 
injury to a finite being is a morally serious matter—even if infinitesimally 
small compared to the magnitude of wrongs against god.
Ordinary intuitions and standard theology agree: justice demands that 
moral debts be settled in some manner. If a being has the ability and au-
thority to act in a way that resolves the moral debts, then she ought to do 
so. And here it is crucial to note that it is possible in every relevant respect 
for god to act in such a way as to address the debt created by Hitler’s evil 
acts. Clearly, it is both logically and causally possible for an omnipotent 
god to impose some sort of punishment on Hitler before accepting him 
into heaven. If it is logically and causally possible for an omnipotent being 
to consign someone to hell for an eternity, then it is logically and causally 
possible for such a being to do so for a finite period.
e. Can god legitimately demand that the victims Forgive and  
Justify Sparing the Wrongdoer Punishment if the Victim Wrongfully Declines?
Another response takes this shape. god can legitimately demand that the 
victim of a wrongdoer forgive the wrongdoer; should the victim sin against 
god by refusing, god can cancel any of the remaining moral debts.
While refusal of a legitimate demand from god is surely sinful, this 
reply is problematic because it is unclear that a morally perfect god could 
legitimately demand an act of forgiveness if it is not antecedently mor-
ally required. In other words, if the victim is not already under an obliga-
tion to forgive the wrongdoer, it is not clear what would justify a morally 
perfect god in making a demand with this consequence. It seems, again, 
not to take seriously enough the victim’s moral status as person with 
legitimate claims against others. Of course, one might be conditionally 
14One might argue that, in some circumstances, a wrongdoer is not an appropriate subject 
of punishment if he does not pay his moral debt to his victim. For example, if A owes B a 
trifling sum of money while B has been released from a great debt by his victim, one might 
think that A should not be pressed to pay his trifling debt to B. First, I do not share the intu-
ition that the fact that B has been released by someone else for a more substantial debt entails 
that B is obligated not to pursue the debt owed by A—unless the release of B has been made 
conditional upon B’s release of A. Second, and more importantly, even if the argument suc-
ceeds here, it is not enough to refute the analysis above. I could easily modify the principle 
to exclude such cases. A more powerful argument strategy is needed here. I am indebted to 
an anonymous referee for this point. See note 10 above.
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required to forgive others to receive god’s forgiveness, and that is surely 
a very good reason to forgive others. but someone might opt to withhold 
forgiveness in these circumstances without committing any sin. Of course, 
such a person will not benefit from God’s forgiveness because the latter’s 
willingness to forgive is tied to the former’s. However, this is a prudential 
matter—and not necessarily a moral matter if forgiveness is not always 
morally required. god can legitimately demand forgiveness only where it 
is antecedently required; and it seems clear that forgiveness is not always 
morally obligatory.
F. Is the Wrongdoer’s Repentance Together with Full Compensation from god 
Enough to Balance the Moral Ledger?
Perhaps the most powerful response is as follows. Anyone instantiating 
CmS will be genuinely repentant for her sins and apologetic towards all 
the victims of her sins—indeed, such a person may be afforded an op-
portunity to apologize to all her victims. Although the victim might be 
at moral liberty to decline to accept the apology and forgive, god could 
nonetheless balance the moral ledger between victim and repentant Chris-
tian sinner by fully compensating the victim for the injuries done to the 
victim. If so, then god can legitimately spare the repentant sinner of any 
punitive or quasi-punitive consequences.
The problem here is that it is not clear that god can fully compensate 
all injuries. We saw that we are limited in the extent to which we can fully 
compensate injuries because our only available currency, money, is incom-
mensurable with certain kinds of injury in this sense: money cannot place 
the injured party in the same position she would have been in prior to the 
injury. Perhaps an omnipotent god has the ability to fully compensate all 
injuries because god has so many more means for doing so at His dis-
posal; indeed, God can offer as compensation eternal bliss—and nothing 
could compensate for any injury better than that.
There are two problems with the idea that god could compensate with 
eternal bliss a victim who refuses to forgive an apologetic, repentant sin-
ner. First, it seems inconsistent with the idea that instantiating CmS dur-
ing one’s lifetime is a necessary condition for being saved and escaping 
punishment. If God can’t offer salvation to those who do not instantiate 
CMS, the most he can offer such people is some other lesser good not 
involving being in heaven. but if traditional Christianity is correct, there 
are only two possible ultimate fates: heaven or hell. So the only kind of 
lesser benefit he could offer them would be a milder form of damnation. 
even assuming this is an option compatible with traditional Christianity 
(as is suggested by the conception of hell developed in Dante’s Inferno), it 
seems implausible to think that “damnation lite” could count as adequate 
compensation.
Second, it is unclear that even eternal bliss can compensate for all in-
juries. Ivan, a protagonist in Dostoevsky’s famous The Brothers Karamazov, 
aptly makes the point:
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Tell me yourself, I challenge you—answer. Imagine that you are creating a 
fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giv-
ing them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to tor-
ture to death only one tiny creature—that baby beating its breast with its fist, 
for instance—and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you 
consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth.15
Now the claim here is a strong one: the universal salvation of all human 
beings cannot compensate for the unjust suffering of an innocent infant. 
Perhaps this is too strong, but it does raise the same problem that hu-
mans encounter with respect to compensation: no matter how good a 
compensatory payoff might be, it cannot restore a person to the position 
they would have been in had they not endured the pain and suffering 
associated with an injury. Past pain and suffering seem very difficult to 
compensate for with a future-looking payment—no matter how good that 
payment might be.
If, of course, the payment is good enough, a person might be willing to 
sell some pain and suffering for a future payment: I would let you hit me 
in the face for a payment of $10,000,000. In such cases, a person might hap-
pily accept the offer and forgive the wrongdoer—which might succeed in 
balancing the moral ledger. But there are difficulties even here; as we saw 
above, punishment might still be required even in this case. As we have 
seen, compensation, together with genuine repentance on the part of the 
wrongdoer and forgiveness on the part of the victim, might not suffice to 
eliminate the need for punishment to restore the moral ledger. In the case 
of a robbery, for example, punishment might be required on retributivist 
grounds to balance the moral ledger, even when there is no utilitarian 
point in punishing. For all we can confidently assert, this might also be 
true in the case where one’s ultimate fate is determined.
g. so Much the Worse for ordinary Intuitions
One might simply argue, in response, that if the idea that god can forgive 
all sin and thereby cancel all debt is inconsistent with ordinary intuitions, 
so much the worse for ordinary intuitions.
but giving up ordinary intuitions comes at a cost. It is important to 
realize that moral intuitions frequently play an important role in philoso-
phy of religion and even theology. Many philosophers, for example, reject 
the Divine Command Theory on the strength of the idea that it is simply 
not true that any propositional content might be morally binding in vir-
tue of being commanded by god; not even god, on this familiar line of 
reasoning, could bring it about that it is morally good to torture live in-
fants simply to watch them suffer. Similarly, theologians have frequently 
rejected certain interpretations of Scripture on the ground that they are 
inconsistent with certain moral principles; passages that have been used 
15Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. C. Garnett (Modern Library, 1996), 
book V, chapter 4.
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to justify slavery and racial segregations are two interpretations that come 
immediately to mind in this regard.
While there are surely instances in which one must be prepared to give 
up one’s moral intuitions as fallible, there are only so many core moral 
intuitions one can deny in connection with god’s activity without raising 
an issue as to whether God is deserving of worship (a moral response) 
or simply a being to be feared (a prudential response). I think biting the 
bullet should be a response of last resort—just as it should in the case of 
other important morally charged issues in philosophical theology, like the 
problem of evil or the proportionality problem for the traditional views 
about hell.
vII. Conclusions
In this essay, I have argued that the doctrine that instantiating CmS is 
sufficient to spare a person of all punishment is difficult to reconcile with 
mainstream views about what justice requires in response to wrongdo-
ing. According to these views, justice requires that the debts owed to the 
victims of wrongdoing be resolved in some way to correct the moral dis-
turbance that wrongful behavior introduces into the world. While it is 
true, on Christian doctrine, that Christ’s death released us from a debt that 
we owe for our wrongs, the relevant debt was owed to god for wrongs 
committed against god. but this suggests that allowing a wicked person to 
escape all punishment on the strength of a deathbed conversion leaves un-
paid moral debts: to the extent that her wrongdoing against other persons 
has never been forgiven by the victims or punished, her salvation leaves 
behind unresolved injustice to her victims. To the extent that God allows 
such injustice, it seems to conflict with God’s moral perfection.16
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16I am indebted to Thomas Flint and anonymous reviewers for extremely helpful com-
ments. I am also indebted to C. Stephen Layman, Patrick macDonald, and rebekah rice for 
their insights and encouragement.
